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Tariffs, quotas and terms-of-trade: the case of New Zealand
Abstract
This paper reports quantitative information on the effects of tariffs and quotas on prices of individual
goods. The analyses uses the natural experiment provided by a comprehensive unilateral trade policy
reform in New Zealand to examine the response of foreign exporters to an incident of liberalisation that
is unique in the developed world. The price effects of tariffs and quotas are estimated using a
multidestination 7-digit longitudinal product-level dataset on export values and quantities. The effects
are found to be by no means equivalent: whereas tariffs display no significant effect, the impact that
quantitative restrictions have on the terms-of-trade of the country that imposes them are unequivocally
detrimental and quantitatively important.
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Abstract 
 
 This paper reports quantitative information on the effects of tariffs and quotas on 
prices of individual goods. The analyses uses the natural experiment provided by a 
comprehensive unilateral trade policy reform in New Zealand to examine the response of 
foreign exporters to an incident of liberalisation that is unique in the developed world. The 
price effects of tariffs and quotas are estimated using a multidestination 7-digit longitudinal 
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1 Introduction 
 
The years 1984-1988 represent a watershed in the area of New Zealand trade policy. By the 
end of the period, the edifice of import licensing that grew out of the import-substitution 
policies of the previous half century was largely torn down. Accompanying  reductions in 
tariff levels that commenced in 1986 furthered the process thus to turn the “Fortress New 
Zealand” into one of the world’s most competitive economies.  
 
We use this unique circumstance of massive trade reform to empirically assess the effects that 
a liberalisation of tariffs and quotas had on the prices charged by foreign exporters selling to 
the country. Both the sign and magnitude of these effects have come to be the matter of some 
controversy. Traditionally, it is only the price effect of quotas that was considered  
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unclear; via stating by how much the price at home exceeds that in the rest of the world, 
tariffs seemed by themselves a good indicator of the effect they have on domestic goods 
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prices. Later work on trade policy under imperfect competition has suggested, however, that 
the effect of either measure on terms-of-trade is likely to depend on usually unknowable 
details about market conduct1. Thus, the terms-of-trade effects of the measures are ultimately 
an empirical matter2.  
 
Three features of the New Zealand incident greatly facilitate an empirical analysis of the 
effects of trade policies on product prices. One is that the country is definitely a ‘small’ 
country. Recovered price effects, if any, are hence unequivocally indicative of the firms’ 
pricing behaviour being subject to the (choice of the) policy imposed3. Next, the extent of the 
reforms in terms of the range of products covered allows for examining the effects of 
restrictions in product markets that differ considerably in the degree of market power that 
sellers are expected to have4. Last but not least, the fact that our dataset is fairly thick in terms 
of number of years allows to estimate the impact of the barriers on prices by comparing the 
price in the barrier-restrained market to that in the ‘same’ market without the barrier. A few 
additional attributes of the New Zealand protective regime are highlighted in a following 
section; altogether, they ensure that our findings are what we consider comfortably 
convincing. 
 
Our central conclusion is that quotas and tariffs have vastly different effects on the terms-of-
trade. Specifically, tariffs have an uncertain effect on prices charged by foreign firms whereas 
                                                 
1 Helpman and Krugman (1989)  is a standard reference.  
2 Quantitative information on these effects is scarce, with Feenstra (1989) being the seminal reference. 
Feenstra’s findings demonstrate an “incomplete pass-through” of the tariff, i.e. suggest that exporters 
will generally not allow consumer prices at the destination to rise by the full amount of the tariff. 
3 For a “large” country, the recovered price effects, if any, might be due to a change in the world 
demand for the good under consideration (as in the standard optimal tariff argument).  
4 In this sense, the study builds on Feenstra (1992, 1993), Goldberg (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes (1994) who investigate the VERs on automobiles and their effects on domestic prices, quality 
upgrading, profits and profit margins. Since New Zealand is the only developed country that has 
undertaken a comprehensive trade liberalisation program, the study complements those of Levinsohn 
(1993) and Harrison (1994) who examine effects of trade liberalisation in Turkey and Côte d'Ivoire 
respectively. It further supplements those studies by focusing on the pricing behaviour of foreign 
exporters, rather than the mark-ups of domestic producers.  
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detrimental effects of quotas on those prices are ubiquitous and quantitatively important. The 
analysis indicates that these findings are robust and fairly stable across industries. 
 
In what follows we first convey the essential points of the controversy surrounding the terms-
of-trade effects of tariffs and the quantitative restrictions (Section 2) and then review some 
pertinent features of the New Zealand protection and liberalisation experience (Section 3). 
The data and empirical model used to estimate the price effects of tariffs and quotas are 
presented in Section 4 while the results are reported and discussed in Section 5. The final 
section concludes. 
 
2  Effects of Trade Barriers on Export Prices5
 
There are basically two ways to think of the effects of trade barriers on export prices. A 
particularly convenient one is to conjecture that, for the product market in question, the price 
is costs determined, with other factors, if any, having no noticeable impact on it. If so, a quota 
Qq and an equivalent ad valorem tariff rate τ = (pq /pf - 1) are deemed to, although raising 
domestic price to pq, let the external price unaltered at pf (Figure 1). Thus the policies are 
expected to have no effect whatsoever on the price charged by foreign exporters selling to 
these markets6. 
----------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------- 
 
Quite to the contrary, not only protection itself but also its form get a crucial determinant of 
the export price once market power in foreign supply is assumed instead. A benchmark case is 
that of a monopolist selling to a segmented destination market (Figure 2). Whereas the price 
(pq) under quota Qq exceeds the free-trade price level pf, the price (pq-T) charged under an 
                                                 
5 Our empirical analysis makes use of export prices, that is prices that an exporter from a particular 
source country charges for the goods shipped to destination countries. Throughout, ‘price’ refers to the 
export price, and the two are used interchangeably.  
6 Presence of domestic market power does not change this result. As long as the foreign supply is 
infinitely elastic, the export price remains exogenously determined.  
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import-equivalent tariff of size T is lower than the free-trade price and, hence, lower than the 
quota induced price7. 
 
----------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
----------------------- 
 
This result, however, turns out to be sensitive to factors such as demand conditions and 
restrictiveness of the quota. For instance, the relative size of the destinations’ markets can 
interact in a way that makes an imposition of a restrictive quota improve rather than worsen 
the terms-of-trade of the country that imposes it (Krishna (1990))8. 
 
The responsiveness of price to the choice of policy becomes even more evident in 
oligopolistic settings where firms’ strategic behaviour comes into play. On one hand, the 
nature of competition (price vis-à-vis quantity) becomes a major determinant of the effect that 
a barrier has on prices; on the other, introducing a barrier might alter the nature of 
competition. Nuances such as size of the quota or history of the industry then play a major 
role in determining the sign and  magnitude of the effects9.  
 
Yet, apart from establishing that a proper analysis of quotas and tariffs’ effects on prices 
charged by foreign firms needs to take into account the induced effect of the measures on 
market conduct, the theoretical work did not take it much further. Moreover, by showing how 
inconclusive and sensitive to assumptions the effects are, the work has indicated that the only 
way to make those insights policy relevant is to assess the effects empirically. 
 
3 Import Protection in New Zealand10
 
                                                 
7The result applies whenever demand is less convex than a constant elasticity demand curve. 
8 This effect is the strongest if the domestic country is small and the domestic (residual) demand curve 
inelastic. 
9 For these results, see Fung (1989), Harris (1985), Ito and Ono (1982, 1984), Krishna (1989), Mai and 
Hwang (1988, 1989), Nordström (1992), Rotemberg and Saloner (1989). 
10 The history of import protection in New Zealand is detailed in publications of the Ministry of 
Commerce (1987, 1990, 1994). 
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Breadth and Depth of the Coverage. A major appeal of the New Zealand case for an empirical 
analysis derives from the fact that the extent of the protection as well as of its liberalisation 
renders the effects of trade barriers on the individual goods prices empirically identifiable. 
Laird and Yeats (1990) report the extent of the nontariff barrier (NTB) coverage for New 
Zealand and the rest of the OECD countries, for 1981, 1983 and 1986, using two measures of 
coverage, namely a frequency ratio (showing the percentage of tariff lines covered by NTBs) 
and a trade coverage ratio (showing a share of total imports subject to NTBs) 11.  
 
Throughout the period New Zealand ranked highest in terms of both indices. For instance, its 
frequency ratio in 1981 (45%) was twenty five percentage points higher than the next highest 
frequency ratio listed (for Norway) while the next highest trade coverage ratio (of Japan) was 
more than twenty percentage points lower than the corresponding ratios for New Zealand 
(46.4%). Moreover, in terms of either index, the share of New Zealand’s imports subject to 
NTBs by far exceeded the average of the OECD countries as a whole (where the frequency 
ratio and the trade coverage ratio were 12.2 and 15.1 respectively) as well as that of the 
OECD developing countries (where the frequency ratio and the trade coverage ratio were 18.7 
and 18.8 respectively).  
 
The extent of the liberalisation was no less pronounced. Its pace was accelerated in 1984, by a 
movement to sell import licenses in a competitive bidding process. So obtained licence prices 
were then used to remove quotas by converting them into ‘equivalent’ tariffs. The phased 
removal of import licensing was completed by the end of 1992 and accompanied by several 
years of tariff harmonisation and reduction. Between July 1988 and July 1992, non-industry 
plan tariffs were reduced using a formula that had the effect of reducing high tariff rates more 
than low ones, thus tending to level the average tariff rate out12. A post-1992 tariff 
                                                 
11An aggregate nature of the measure precludes their usage in assessing quotas’ effects on prices of 
individual goods. Moreover, to the extent that one’s interest is in the severity of the restrictions, neither 
index conveys the correct information. In particular, rather than stating how much trade is prevented 
from taking place because of the restrictions, the indices show how much trade takes place under the 
restriction. 
12 The formula was introduced by the Swiss and used to harmonise the tariff levels around the world 
following the final Tokyo Round Agreement (1979). It is: tariff reduction = τ/(τ+0.14), where τ = the 
existing tariff rate. Hence, a 70 percent existing tariff rate would be cut by about 83 percent, whereas a 
10 percent existing tariff would be cut by 42 percent. 
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programme, announced in March 1990, provided that most tariffs would reduce to a 
maximum level of ten percent until July 199613. 
 
Composition of Protection. Another appealing feature of the New Zealand protection 
concerns its composition in terms of both products covered and the measures used to do so. 
As to the latter, tariffs and quantitative restrictions were the exclusive measures practised. 
Furthermore, the incidence of the quantitative restrictions was confined to only two measures: 
non-automatic licensing regulations (requirements for an approval which is not granted freely 
or automatically, as a prior condition to importation) and quotas (global or bilateral, other 
than VERs and MFA restraints). Although a few licences were administered on a volume 
basis (leather goods, footwear, writing instruments, wallpaper, golf clubs and badminton 
rackets), most New Zealand import licensing restrictions were denominated in value terms, 
meaning that they restricted value rather than quantity of imports.  
 
In contrast to the quantitative restrictions coverage of the agricultural sector that has been 
characteristic of most OECD countries and the EC countries in particular, an emphasis on the 
protection of manufacturers is typical of the coverage in New Zealand. The quantitative 
restrictions applied to virtually all import-competing goods produced while covering more 
than twenty five percent of the country’s 1981 imports. Incidentally, the most important 
import category (30.4 percent of all imports in June 1982), Machinery and Transport 
Equipment, was also the category with the smallest proportion of imports (49.2 percent) 
exempt from import licensing14. 
 
Finally, note that trade barriers in New Zealand were put in place to counter the country’s 
deteriorating overseas currency reserves difficulties, rather than in response to trade 
performance. This detail hedges our estimates against the simultaneity problem that arises 
when barriers are put in place in response to the international trade outcomes. 
 
4 Data and the Empirical Model 
 
Data. Our empirical analysis uses a 7-digit longitudinal product-level data set on annual 
values and quantities over the period 1973 to 1994. The data were pooled from publications 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce and include annual value and quantity exported from 
                                                 
13 As compared to, let’s say, 1981 when the average tariff rate was about 28 per cent.  
14 The quantitative information in this section comes from Laird and Yeats (1990). 
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the United States to eight destination countries for eight SITC classification categories. The 
control destinations, Canada, Denmark, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Japan and 
Australia, are selected to include major trading partners of the source country and to provide 
variation in terms of both size and distance from the US.  
 
The choice of industries (cars, cartires, airplanes, motorcycles, film, paper, bourbon, books) 
was driven by several factors. One was to provide a variety as to the extent of protection and 
the type of products in terms of the degree of market power that sellers are expected to have. 
Another was to include products that are important and continuing import categories for New 
Zealand but also for the control destinations, in an attempt to develop a balanced panel15. In 
addition to the time span involved, the latter task was obstructed by difficulties involved in 
designing a concordance map required for putting the data set together. To start with, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce publications used three different classification schemes, namely 
TSUS, SITC(R2) and HS based classifications. The difficulties were compounded by the fact 
that the Customs Tariff of New Zealand has undergone seven (non one-to-one) 
transformations during the 1973-1994 period. The tariff data were taken from these seven 
publications16. 
 
The data on annual values are in units of the exporter’s currency ($US) at the port of export 
(f.o.b. prices)17. They are divided by the corresponding annual destination-specific export 
quantities to construct a data set of unit values that are then used as the dependant variable - 
the export price. Since they are all expressed in $US, these unit values have the virtue of 
being readily comparable across destinations. 
 
The multidestination data on export values and quantities are available at the 7-digit industry 
level only.  Thus, it is possible in principle that unit values to a particular destination may 
decline due to a change in the variety of goods purchased within the category rather than a 
                                                 
15 This has, unfortunately, proved impossible at the end, mostly due to the length of the time period. 
Even among the industries sampled, data on paper, film and motorcycles are available until 1988 only. 
16 The assistance of Brian Sheard of New Zealand Customs in designing the latter concordance is 
gratefully acknowledged. While a comparison of the tariff coefficients across destination markets 
would be interesting, for the issue analysed here it is of somewhat marginal relevance and thus does 
not justify the costs it would entail.  
17 f.o.b. prices are free of transportation and distribution costs as well as retail and tariff markups. 
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change in price of each variety. Whether this can explain the behaviour of prices of exports to 
New Zealand relative to other destinations will be considered once the evidence is presented. 
To foreshadow that discussion, we find this an extremely unlikely explanation of the findings. 
 
The Model. To analyse the export price adjustment for a 7-digit industry we estimate the 
following model:   
 
pit = γ τNZ,t +λNZ dt + β xit + εit  
εit =  λi + θt + uit  
where i (i = 1,2,...,N) and t (t = 1,2,..., T) index the destination market for exports and time, 
respectively, p is the log of the destination-specific export price (as defined above), τNZ,t is the 
log of the tariff rate, x is a matrix of control variables that include the exchange rate and GDP, 
and 
 
d
t
t =
≥⎧⎨⎩
1   if  and destination is New Zealand
 0  otherwise                                                      .
1987
 
 
The model extends Knetter’s (1994) specification of an export price equation by introducing a 
more general covariance matrix as to allow estimation in the presence of AR(1) 
autocorrelation within panels and heteroscedasticity across panels18. In other words, we 
assume 
                                                 
18 We have estimated a more general version where the autocorrelation parameter varies across panels. 
The model, however, did not offer a significant improvement. We have also considered estimating a 
system of seemingly unrelated regressions. One way to do it would be to interpret the data as a cross-
section of time series, and allow for contemporaneous correlation between errors across destinations. 
In addition to the fact that the time effects account for all common shocks to prices across countries 
anyway, two factors spoke against this option. First, the model greatly proliferates the number of 
parameters to be estimated; second, the SUR estimator requires a balanced panel, and the consequent 
loss in efficiency due to a reduced sample size would by far outweigh the gains obtained by assuming a 
more general covariance matrix. The latter factor played a major role for not pursuing the other, albeit 
more appealing possibility, namely pooling across industries to capture correlations across industries 
for a given year and destination. 
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The time effects,
E u u js[ ] =
i j
i jit
θ t , are introduced to capture the unobservable effects that are constant across 
estinations but may vary over time and, hence, account for changes in costs of production d
through time. The destination-specific effects, λ i ,  control, on the other hand, for the 
unobservable effects that are constant over time but assumed to vary across destinations. As
such, they account for potential time-invariant differences in the composition of impor
within category or differences in the competitive conditions across destinations. Thus, the 
model makes it feasible to, for a given average quality of destination-specific imports, 
disentangle the change in price due to a change in the destination-specific markup from one
that comes from a cost change. 
 
In general, one can choose to model 
 
ts 
 
λ i s and θt s as random effects or as fixed effects. We 
pted for the latter for a couple of reasons. First, we are interested in the magnitude of the 
 
e 
dropped to avoid singularity. Here, the destination effect for New Zealand is dropped and, 
consequently, the destination-specific effect for each country will measure the average export 
price difference (in percentage terms) between destination i and New Zealand during the pre-
specific GDP and exchange rate, are normalised around their means, the constant term equals 
the price to NZ in 1973 at the average values of the GDP and exchange rate series.   
                                                
o
parameters19. Second, we suspect that the destination-specific effects are correlated with the
explanatory variables20. In estimation, one time- and one destination-specific effect must b
1987 period. Similarly, year 1973 is excluded. Since our control variables, the country-
21
 
ination market. To construct it, the annual average nominal exchange 
19 The estimation can be done in levels or in differences. By estimating in first differences we would 
difference out all the country-specific effects except for the NZ dummy in the period when the reforms 
occurred. These, however, can be of interest since the timing of the reforms bite is fairly inexact. We 
thus decided to use the levels specification. 
20 It is, for instance, highly likely that the composition of imports is correlated with the country’s 
income. 
21 The exchange rate series is expressed in units of buyer’s currency per US$, and deflated by the 
wholesale price index in the dest
 9
 The motivation to control for exchange rate effects comes from the pricing to market 
literature (see e.g. Marston (1990), Knetter (1993)), where exchange rates were found to be
significant determinants of the changes in the destination-specific markups. Taking into 
account that a heavy depreciation of the currency paralleled New Zealand’s trade 
liberalisation program of the mid-80s, we include the exchange rate as an explanatory 
variable in order to isolate the effects of trade restrictions. Moreover, the estimated exchange 
rate coefficients will be used to test for the symmetric pass-through of tariffs and exch
 
ange 
tes à la Feenstra (1989). GDP is included as a demand shifter. 
s 
s; in 
ters may 
s 
 
 
 
ra
 
Feenstra’s (1989) work is the one that provides a seminal evidence on the quantitative effect
of tariffs on the prices of individual goods. The export prices may be unaffected by tariff
that case, the pass-through of the tariff is said to be complete. Alternatively, expor
lower their prices following a tariff increase; the tariff pass-through is then referred to a
incomplete and local prices will be found to increase by less than the amount of the tariff. The
coefficient γ measures the price-effect of the tariff. It will be zero in the former and negative
in the latter case.  
As for λ i s, there might be country-specific characteristics that cause the average prices to 
differ across destinations. A higher λi might, for instance, reflect a persistently higher quality 
of goods within the specific export category . Systematically higher22 λ i s across industries are 
more likely, however, to indicate a country-specific idiosyncrasy, such as substantially more 
                                                                                                                                            
e goods will be in different ratios to marginal cost. 
rates and the wholesale price indices published in various issues of the International Financial 
Statistics are used. Adjusting the series by taking the log of the series divided by its mean, imposes the 
condition that export prices are unaffected by the changes in the exchange rate that are linked to 
inflation in the destination country. To construct the GDP variable, we use the IFS series on real GDP 
(in 1990 prices) in local currency. For Germany, this series is not available for the entire period and, 
hence, we deflate nominal GDP by the CPI. This series is then also adjusted by taking logs and 
normalising around the mean. 
22 The model allows that goods shipped to different destinations are similar rather than identical. The 
prices that firms charge for thos
 10
anti-competitive import restrictions relative to the rest of the world23. The restrictions would 
y 
hat the average post-liberalisation markup has decreased, we ought to find 
NZ<0. 
 
by the 
import 
ntitlement. Consequently, their actions do not affect the relative price and, hence, the 
enable exporters to capture some of the associated rent, and the export prices to that 
destination would thus be higher than to those charged to the rest of the world.  
 
If the quantitative restrictions in New Zealand were significant and the rents were not full
captured by domestic importers, the average level of markup over cost to New Zealand should 
have fallen following the liberalisation. The coefficient λNZ is introduced to measure this 
effect. In the case t
λ
 
Is it possible that a reduction, if any, in λNZ reflects a liberalisation induced fall in quality 
purchased? Work by Feenstra (1993) and others has, in fact, suggested that quotas may induce 
quality upgrading which could have the effect of increasing unit values even if the price of a 
given quality remained unchanged. The fact that quotas in New Zealand were denominated in
value, rather than volume, terms is, therefore, crucial. Importers who are constrained 
value of goods they import maximise their returns with respect to each dollar of 
e
composition of imports within the restricted category relative to free trade24. 
 
5 Interpretation of the Results 
                                                 
23 To see why, recall that the equilibrium prices in each market will eventually be determined by the
exporters’ perceptions of the elasticities of dem
 
and facing them in those markets and, therefore, be not 
ly the same. Since there is no reason to believe that shapes of (residual) industry demand 
specific relationships in relative prices in those industries are better interpreted as country- rather than 
 prices of 
 for both varieties are equal. 
necessari
schedules for a wide range of industries differ systematically across destinations, systematic country-
industry-specific. 
24 To see the latter, suppose that pi and pj, and piexp and pjexp stand for the domestic and export
a cheaper and a more expensive variety of the import category under consideration. If importers are 
facing a limit on the value of imports, they will find it profitable to import each variety up to the point 
where the return per dollar spent is the same for both varieties, i.e. until (pi - piexp)/ piexp = (pj - pjexp)/ 
pjexp. Thus, in equilibrium, the relative price at home does not differ from the relative export price, i.e. 
pi / pj = piexp/ pjexp. The case is in contrast to that of volume quotas, were importers are optimising at the 
point where premia
 11
 To examine the price impact of tariffs and quotas, we begin by an exploratory analysis of the 
export price charged to New Zealand relative to the export price charged to “rest of the 
world” throughout the sample period. We compute the latter price as an average of the u
values charged to all other destinations, namely Canada, Denmark, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Switzerland, Japan and Australia. The resulting time-series plots ar
nit 
e depicted in 
igure 3. 
st 
s (in particular, only the prices for paper and motorcycles seem to, for an extended 
eriod of time, move in directions opposite to those in which the world prices for the 
spective goods do). This indicates that it is, indeed, the same factor - marginal cost - that is 
the main determinant of these prices. ata, however, reveals an 
idiosyncrasy of the New Zealand pric  having a  tendency to exceed those 
in the rest of the world throughout th od, the prices fell below the average 
“world” price level around the mid or late 80s ained there until the end of the 
n the 
----------------------- 
The Price to NZ relative to world price/Pre-reform is computed by subtracting the 
e  
nts to New Zealand was on average 9.4 percent 
F
 
 
----------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
----------------------- 
 
A first notable pattern is that the two prices move approximately in the same direction in mo
of the case
p
re
 A closer look at the d
e movements. While
e first half of the peri
and have rem
period.  
 
To further unravel this pattern, we calculate “differences in differences”, i.e. changes i
log-difference in export prices to New Zealand relative to the rest of the world. Table 1 
reports the numbers.  
 
Table 1 about here 
----------------------- 
 
logarithmic average “world” price for each year in the pre-reform period from th  logarithm
of the price to New Zealand in that particular year. These differences can be used to gauge the 
percentage difference in the price between New Zealand and the rest of the world in that year. 
For instance, the price charged on car shipme
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lower than the price charged on shipments to the rest of destinations during the period 
preceding the liberalisation25.  
 
The average log-differences in prices to New Zealand relative to prices to the rest of world in 
 log-
ice increased to -.453, i.e. to -36.5 percent. Thus, the relative car price 
harged to New Zealand fell by about 29.8 percent following the liberalisation The associated 
t-statistic of  4.88 indicates that the d
hypothesis of no change between the is economically substantial decline 
in export prices is supported by the rest of the data. The decrease in the relative price varies 
om 16.3 percent for bourbon to 79.7 percent for paper. It is interesting to notice that the 
nchanged 
s 
 
ore ought to be going on. Incidentally, the recovered 
attern in price differentials is compatible with an anti-competitive nature of quantitative 
the period following the liberalisation, Post-reform, are computed in a way analogous to the 
above and reported in the third column of Table 1. We see, for example, that the average
difference in the car pr
c
ecline is statistically significant, i.e. we reject the 
two sub-periods. Th
fr
average price of books (that had no restriction imposed) actually rose. Finally, the u
price of motorcycles is most likely due to the fact that the sample period ends in 1988, i.e. it i
too short for the changes to be accounted for. 
 
Although the falling prices to New Zealand described in Figure 3 and Table 1 could, in 
principle, result from a potential downward trend in costs of production, the rising price
differentials indicate that something m
p
restrictions. Our regression analysis strongly supports this conjecture.  
 
----------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
----------------------- 
 
A summary of the regression results is reported in Table 2. The GLS coefficients displayed 
are estimated with both destination specific heteroscedasticity and AR(1) errors26. For each 
                                                 
25 The percentage difference is computed as ex-1, where x is the log-difference. 
26 We tested for non-stationarity. Separate unit root tests for the regression residuals for each 
destination and industry were conducted. There are 63 such residual series varying in length from 11 to 
22 annual observations. We address the problem of potentially low power in rejecting the null 
hypothesis by using the Dickey-Fuller-GLS test as recently proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock 
cases. Rejection failed (1996). This test rejected the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in 7 out of 10 
 13
industry (except for books on whose imports no restriction had been imposed),  the resul
given for both unrestricted and restricted specifications. The restricted model constrains t
tariff and exchange rate effects to be equal. The hypothesis of symmetric pass-through of 
tariffs and exchange rates, along the lines of Feenstra (1989), was tested by a likelihood ra
test
ts are 
he 
tio 
 the industries at the 5 
ercent level of significance, thus confirming Feenstra’s findings. 
 
To further examine the price effects o ir price elasticities based on the  
unrestricted model28. Conceptually, t e as the pass-through elasticities 
ported in Feenstra (1989). The first thing to notice is that the coefficients are largely 
s 
o 
hat do the industries within the two clusters have in common? One factor that could explain 
price effect of a tariff will be negative. So, in all, airplanes, tires, film and paper,  US imports 
c
                                                                                                                                           
27. The tests showed that this restriction cannot be rejected in any of
p
f tariffs, consider the
hey are much the sam
re
insignificant29. They also indicate that the tariff induced export price adjustment, if any, tend
to differ across industries. In some, such as airplanes, tires, film and paper, exporters seem t
have lowered their prices in response to the tariff liberalisation. In others, namely, cars, 
motorcycles and bourbon, the export prices rose as tariffs declined, indicating an incomplete 
pass-through of tariffs to the consumer prices in those industries. In other words, the tariff 
liberalisation there has led to a terms-of-trade loss for the country that liberalised, despite the 
fact that the country under consideration is definitely a small country.  
 
W
the differences in price effects is the share of the US imports in total imports of the 
corresponding categories. In particular, the smaller the share, the more likely it is that the 
onstituted a significant chunk of total imports and the tariff effect was positive. In contrast, 
 
ion increases the efficiency with which the other 
ise, estimates of the exchange rate coefficients differ across industries and, in most cases, are 
tter 
mostly where only relatively few data points were available. While more powerful test statistics based 
on joint residuals in a panel regression have yet to be developed, we take this as evidence that non-
stationarity is not a serious problem in our data. 
27 The tests were based on the approximate likelihood ratio statistics, as recommended in Greene 
(1993). 
28 As apparent from Table 2, imposing the restrict
parameters are estimated. The gains are, however, small. 
29 Likew
not significant. These results are in line with those reported elsewhere. (See, for instance, Kne
(1993)). 
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the US shares in cars, bourbon and motorcycles were relatively negligible thus apparen
motivating the sellers to “price to market”.  
 
The magnitude of the elasticities ranges from .03 for bourbon to .71 for motorcycles in th
case of the negative price effects, and .06 (airplanes) to .51 (paper) for the positive price 
effects. In addition to the considerations discussed above, it appears to be a function of the 
conditions in domestic supply. Thus, a notable size of the point estimate for paper (0.51 
(0.99)), where there existed a high degree of market power in domestic 
tly 
e 
supply, stands in a 
harp contrast with that of the point estimate for airplanes (0.06 (0.08)), where the domestic 
e to tariff 
).  
ng 
on is again shown in Table 2 where, in the NZ 
rade Reform row, the (GLS) point estimates for λNZs for different industries are reported. As 
f 
s 
t 
harged by foreign exporters fell from about 10 percent for tires to about 49 and 51 percent 
s
supply is virtually non-existent. Along the same lines, one can argue that the presence of one 
or another form of domestic competition has led to a more pronounced price respons
changes in cars (-0.64 (0.46)) or motorcycles (0.71 (0.79)) relative to bourbon (0.03 (0.27)
 
The fuzziness surrounding the price effects of tariffs and their overall insignificance in 
particular does, in a way, make the findings on the price impact of quotas a genuinely striki
and interesting result. The relevant informati
T
explained earlier, the estimates of these coefficients can be used to gauge the price impact o
quotas, for they equal the percentage change in the relative price charged to New Zealand’
quota-restrained market as compared to the relative price charged to the same market withou
quota, ceteris paribus30.  
 
The estimated price impacts are all but one (motorcycles) negative31. Moreover, four out of 
the remaining six are significant at the ten percent level (five out of the remaining six when 
based on the model that imposes symmetry of exchange rate and tariff pass-through). The 
most remarkable feature of the estimates, however, is their magnitude. It indicates that prices 
c
                                                 
30 Such a measure of the impact of  the quota on price resembles quite closely that suggested by 
Feenstra (1995). The measure improves on all measures used so far and discussed in Laird and Ye
(1990, pp28-30). 
31
ats 
 An insufficient time-span of the data on motorcycles is the most likely reason for the insignificant 
f books throughout the period. The category was included for comparison purposes only. 
and positive coefficient found there. The positive coefficient on books, although perhaps interesting in 
its own right, has no substantial bearing on the questions posed here since no restriction has existed on 
imports o
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for cars and airplanes, respectively. The most sizeable decrease in price (70%) was found fo
paper, the industry that is characterised by highly concentrated market power in domestic 
supply, whereas the price 
r 
effect of the quota liberalisation was among the lowest in bourbon 
3%) where no substantial market power in either domestic or foreign supply existed. Thus, 
at the 
censing had on prices charged by the US exporters as a whole, it makes some sense to 
are loss 
 
ke a balance between several considerations 
namely, (i) the calendar year of the exemption date (having all goods exempt license), (ii) that 
                                                
(2
our analysis not only shows how ubiquitous and significant the detrimental effects of quotas 
on the terms-of-trade are, but also testifies how the magnitude of the effect surges when the 
quota comes to facilitate collusion between the domestic and foreign suppliers.  
 
One can play with these numbers to get some feeling for how much the import licensing 
really cost the country. One interesting calculation involves computing approximate partial 
equilibrium welfare losses due to quotas. We ignore triangles and calculate the losses as a 
product of the volume of imports in the year 1985 and the estimated price effect of 
liberalisation. The following numbers ensued: $279 790 for cars, $22 100 for tires, $ 891 480 
for airplanes, $21 250 for film, $177 800 for paper and $73 830 for bourbon.  
 
If one is willing to presume that these price effects are indicative of the effects th
li
compute an average welfare loss associated with quotas on the US imports. We again 
consider year 1985. The total value of the US exports to New Zealand amounted to 727 
million dollars. The average price drop, computed as the arithmetic mean of all the price 
effects of quotas in our sample, was about  27 percent. Thus, we gauge that the welf
due to quotas on the US imports in 1985 was about 196 million dollars, which amounts to 
almost one percent of the country’s GNP at the time.32
 
----------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
----------------------- 
The clear-cut nature and the robustness of these findings are evident from the information 
displayed in Table 3. First, the results are not sensitive to our choice of the cutoff years33. The 
breaking point was chosen ex ante and to stri
 
32 All the numbers are in the 1985 US dollars. 
33 The year “1987” in definition of the dummy variable dt stands, in fact, for 1986 (for paper, film, 
bourbon and motorcycles), 1989 (for cars and tires) and 1987 (otherwise). 
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not all data are available for the entire period, leading to an imprecise measurement and h
variability of, predominantly, the post-reform price differences, and (iii) that quantitativel
measurable effects will appear only towards the end of the 80s. 
 
The first row in Table 3 restates the point estimates for
igh 
y 
 λNZ s based on our choice of cutoff 
ears, t, as explained above. We reran the regressions with t-1 and t+1 instead. So obtained 
point estimates are shown in the corre e of the results is invalidated by 
these changes. All the coefficients tha ain significant in t+1 (and 
slightly lower in magnitude). It is als nt estimates for airplanes and 
aper are not significant in t-1, yet become significant in t and are still significant in t+1. 
, 
oncern, we reran the original 
gression while consecutively replacing the New Zealand dummy by dummy variables for 
lly, 
r 
ell, 
t the 
 
wards zero since these 
ffects are negative.)  
extent to which the terms-of-trade of a country are affected by its protective regime. The 
t ted that these effects are inconclusive and that 
y
sponding rows. Non
t are significant in t rem
o noteworthy that poi
p
Finally, the point estimate for tires (-0.21 (0.11)), which comes to be significant in t+1 only
indicates that the reforms (in some sectors) required time to bite in. 
 
A final caveat with respect to interpretation of our findings relates to the fact that some 
country (or countries) other then New Zealand could be the real story. That is, some other 
country may have experienced rising prices after the mid-eighties which could help account 
for the declining relative price to New Zealand. To address this c
re
all the other countries in the sample. The lower part of Table 3 presents the findings. Actua
there is a country in the sample whose point estimates display alike behaviour in the sense 
that four of them are negative and significant – Australia. But this, in fact, only supports ou
conclusions and is due to the fact that Australia has undergone a trade policy reform as w
and approximately at the same time. Furthermore, the fact that two markets had reforms a
same time means that the estimated time effects will reflect some of this as a general 
downward trend in price. In other words, this feature of the data is likely to bias our estimates
of the New Zealand price effects downwards. (Or, more precisely, to
e
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The experiences of New Zealand product markets in the aftermath of the trade policy reform 
of the mid eighties provide a natural experiment with which to investigate empirically the 
heoretical work on trade policy has sugges
even their signs are highly sensitive to the form of protection adopted. 
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Yet, this study shows that the reality is much less equivocal. The estimates are based on a 
longitudinal  data set and thus superior to all the measures proposed in the literature so far. 
They indicate that the price effects of tariffs and quotas are in fact fairly clear and stable 
across industries: tariffs show no significant effect; quotas unambiguously increase the export
prices. Tariffs and quotas are, hence, not at all equivalent. Consequently, the usage of so-
called tariff equivalents of quotas in gauging the price and welfare impact of the latter
highly questionable exercise. The computable general and partial equilibrium models that are 
commonly used for evaluating these effects in practice tend thus vastly to understate the 
benefits of trade libera
 
 is a 
lisation.  
rincipal message of the analysis is that quotas are a very expensive form of 
rotection. The deteriorating effects quotas have on the terms-of-trade of the country that 
them. The quantitative 
formation exhibited in this paper is our case for dismantling nontariff barriers to trade. 
s of 
De 
Ed Tower for suggesting the present title of the paper. 
emaining errors are our own.  
iles: 
, 
 
The final and p
p
imposes them are quantitatively important and ubiquitous. Inasmuch as the economic impact 
of nontariff barriers is akin to those of quotas, their apparent burgeoning across the 
industrialised world ought to be cause for concern. Putting aside their redistribute effects 
within a country, the nontariff barriers redistribute income away from, and thus have a 
pronounced detrimental effect on the welfare of the country that erects 
in
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Figure 3. US Export prices to New Zealand and to World
P
ric
e 
(in
 U
S
$)
Paper
year
 New Zealand  World
1978 1983 1988
.3
1.1
1.9
2.7
P
ric
e 
pe
r 
m
et
er
 (
in
 U
S
$)
Movie film, unexposed, over 35mm
year
 New Zealand  World
1973 1978 1983 1988
.05
.1
.15
P
ric
e 
(in
 U
S
$)
Bourbon Whiskey
year
 New Zealand  World
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
3
10
17
24
P
ric
e 
(in
 U
S
$)
Technical Books
year
 New Zealand  World
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
1
3
5
7
 24
 25
 
Table 1: Price to New Zealand  relative to world price, pre-and post-reforma.
 
Industry Pre-reform Post-reform t-test for change in 
relative priceb
    
    
Cars    -.0991 -.4536 4.88  
 (0.067) (0.028)  
Cartires  .0949 -.0876 3.11 
 (0.029) (0.051)  
Airplanes  -.3520 -1.2161 5.10  
 (0.088) (0.145)  
Motorcycles -0.9932 -0.9273 -0.36 
 (0.154) (0.098)  
Film 0.3249 -0.1016 3.09 
 (0.065) (0.122)  
Paper 0.0297 -1.5656 7.51 
 (0.159) (0.141)  
Bourbon  .0917 -.0867 1.31 
 (0.113) (0.075)  
Books  -.3100 -.0660 -2.02     
 (0.081) (0.090)  
    
 
Notes: 
a Log-difference. Standard errors are in parentheses. The world price is the average price 
charged to Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Japan and 
Australia. 
b The null hypothesis is that the log-difference between the New Zealand price and the world 
price is unchanged over the two periods. 
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Table 2 
GLS Regression Results for the Price Effects of Tariffs and Quotas 
 Cars Tires Airplanes Motor Cycles Film Paper Bourbon Books 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  
Canada   -.5042*    -.4694*  -.2290*    -.2652*     .0196     0177  1.014*     1.058*   -.6146*  -.6114*  -.9820*  -1.014* -.2772*  -.2743*           
           (.161)       (.156)  (.055)       (.050)     (.092)      (.091)   (.219)      (.214)   (.179)    (.178)  (.262)   (.254) (.118)   (.117)           
Denmark  -.0742      -.0406   .0509       .0159      .4068*    .4059*   .6558*     .7033*   -.4301*  -.4291*   .3812    .3499 -.1514   -.1484   .0588   
           (.109)       (.103)  (.066)       (.061)     (.132)      (.131)   (.276)      (.269)   (.138)    (.136)  (.390)   (.387) (.118)   (.117)  (.147)   
United Kingdom  .0709       .1009   .0151      -.0168      .1007      .0978    .6744*    .7184*   -.4892*  -.4868*  -.4253   -.4362 -.0434   -.0391   .2458*  
           (.105)       (.100)  (.067)       (.064)     (.114)      (.113)   (.173)      (.169)   (.130)    (.129)  (.310)   (.308) (.112)   (.111)  (.112)   
Germany  .1088       .1412  -.1170*    -.1515*     .4805*    .4805*    .9547*   1.000*  -.3531*  -.3511*   .2787    .2630 -.2229*  -.2193*   .2385*  
           (.099)       (.092)  (.066)       (.062)     (.101)      (.101)   (.164)      (.159)   (.128)    (.127)  (.301)   (.299) (.122)   (.121)  (.120)   
Switzerland  .3744*     .4070*   .0260      -.0082      .3305*    .3304*  1.083*      1.127*   -.0760    -.0753   .2205    .2019 -.1497   -.1463   .2287   
           (.114)       (.108)  (.061)       (.055)     (.101)      (.101)   (.170)      (.165)   (.114)    (.113)  (.328)   (.326) (.115)   (.114)  (.143)   
Japan  .2173*     .2479*  -.1720*    -.2048*     .6088*    .6069*  1.074*     1.118*  -.6565*  -.6494*   .4179    .4121 -.1734   -.1691   .4769*  
           (.112)       (.107)  (.068)       (.064)     (.127)      (.126)   (.190)      (.186)   (.110)    (.108)  (.272)   (.273) (.118)   (.116)  (.138)   
Australia   -.3225*    -.2877*  -.0490      -.0850      .0855      .0878    .9136*    .9588*  -.4900*  -.4875*  -.2900   -.3176 -.0681   -.0652   .0506   
           (.134)       (.128)  (.073)       (.069)     (.116)      (.116)   (.177)      (.173)   (.110)    (.109)  (.273)   (.274) (.121)   (.120)  (.127)   
GDP  -.1287      -.1332  -.2481      -.2692      .0680      .0679    .6626      .6592  -1.206*   -1.152*   .2158    .4998 -.0206   -.0141   .0365   
           (.426)       (.426)  (.234)       (.233)     (.472)      (.470)   (.628)      (.634)   (.554)    (.549) (1.649)   (1.62) (.321)   (.319)  (.522)   
Exchange Rate   -.2203        -.3172*       .1893        .3722       -.0666      -.0752    -.1270      .0672   
           (.302)         (.135)         (.317)        (.344)        (.331)      (.532)    (.203)     (.327)   
Tariff  -.6397         .1330         .0634        -.7139       .1719       .5105    -.0322              
           (.463)         (.296)         (.078)        (.791)        (.140)      (.998)    (.271)              
Exchange Rate =  -.3338  -.2312*     .0713    .1886    .1464   .1604  -.0920  
Tariff  (.268)  (.121)     (.075)   (.323)   (.132)  (.442)  (.168)  
NZ Trade Reform  -.6660*    -.4810*  -.0971      -.2637*     -.7145*   -.7137*    .0842      .1330   -.4031*  -.4009* -1.217*  -1.271* -.2605   -.2544   .0966   
           (.315)       (.220)  (.158)       (.103)     (.197)      (.196)   (.297)      (.293)  (.174)    (.172)  (.382)   (.374) (.163)   (.161)  (.168)   
Log Likelihood 114.75     114.55  233.87     232.28   73.00     72.68    73.08    71.69 81.15 80.47 30.10 30.05 161.58 161.46 98.23 
LR test statistic 0.40 3.18 0.64 2.78 1.36 0.10 0.24  
Time period 73-94 73-94 73-94 73-88 73-88 78-88 73-94 73-94 
Observations 168 176       156     115 125 88 169 154 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithmic export unit value. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with a * are significant at the 10% significance level.  
Results are given for both unrestricted and restricted specifications (except for books where tariffs do not apply): Tariff and exchange rate effects are unconstrained in (1)  
and constrained to be equal in (2). The likelihood ratio test statistic is for a test of (2) against (1). The critical value for a χ2(1) variables are 2.7 at the 10 percent and 3.8 at the 5 percent level of 
significance. 
Each regression includes a constant and a set of T-1 period specific dummy variables, and all models are estimated by GLS with destination specific heteroscedasticity and AR(1) errors. 
        
 
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis. 
 
 Cars Tires Airplane Mcycles Film Paper Bourbon Books 
         
1. Variations in the New Zealand dummy timing      
t -.6660* -.0971  -.7145* .0842   -.4031* -1.217* -.2605 .0966 
 (.315) (.158)  (.198)  (.297)  (.174) (.382) (.163) (.168) 
t+1 -.3900* -.2139*  -.7116*  .0913   -.3980* -.9608* -.1808 .3089* 
 (.164) (.115)  (.161)  (.277)  (.164) (.407) (.162) (.157) 
t-1 -.3339* -.2378  -.3571  .1700   -.5260* -.7096 -.1173 .3901* 
 (.190) (.166)  (.287)  (.332)  (.188) (.518) (.172) (.163) 
2. Variations in reference country       
Canada   -.0872 -.1159*  .0777 .1862   -.6248* .4090* .2971*  
                 (.297) (.052)  (.168)  (.358)  (.306) (.213) (.098)  
Denmark .0053 .0546  -.0100  -.5483  .3983 -.5009 -.0863 .2630 
                 (.163) (.094)  (.252)  (.366)  (.286) (.527) (.101) (.212) 
United Kingdom   .0024 .0523  -.1843  -.0156  .3124 -.2796 .1567* .0252 
                 (.148) (.098)  (.188)  (.184)  (.228) (.330) (.080) (.121) 
Germany -.0215 .2149*  -.0286  -.0788  .2676 .7153* .2166* .0055 
                 (.124) (.082)  (.154)  (.103)  (.209) (.255) (.112) (.142) 
Switzerland -.0672 .1563*  .1522  .2513   .2584 .8576* -.2159* -.2763 
                 (.179) (.072)  (.169)  (.152)  (.199) (.360) (.085) (.199) 
Japan     .3371* -.2094*  .9568*  -.1297  .1960 .2128 -.0195 -.1076 
                 (.151) (.100)  (.143)  (.226)  (.153) (.246) (.120) (.202) 
Australia -.1665 -.0375  -.3509* .0852   -.4409* -.7074* -.2188* -.0369 
                 (.229) (.112) (.187) (.203) (.165) (.199) (.115) (.171) 
 
Notes: 
All coefficients are based on GLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients marked 
with a * are significant at the 10% significance level. 
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